This paper studies a model of a sequential auction where bidders are allowed to acquire further information about their valuations of the object in the middle of the auction. It is shown that, in any equilibrium where the distribution of the final price is atornless, a bidder's best response has a simple characterization. In particular, the optimal information acquisition point is the same, regardless of the other bidders' actions. This makes it natural to focus on symmetric, undominated equilibria, as in the Vickrey auction. An existence theorem for such a class of equilibria is presented. The paper also presents some results and numerical simulations that compare this sequential auction with the one-shot auction. 8equential auctions typically yield more expected revenue for the seller than their one-shot counterparts. 80 the possibility of mid-auction information acquisition can provide an explanation for why sequential procedures are more often adopted.
Introduction
This paper studies a continuously ascending price independent private values auction, with the added richness that bidders are allowed to acquire further information about the value of the good in the middle of the auction. The information structure allows bidders to have different initial signals of their valuation and different privately known costs of acquiring information. The framework can also accommodate for the possibility of some bidders already knowing their valuation at the outset of the auction or, conversely, not being able to acquire information with some probability.
It turns out that in some aspects the optimal strategy of a bidder in such an auction is quite simple. For example, the price at which information is acquired does not depend on the expected behavior of the other players. This greatly simplifies the characterization, numerical computation, and proving the existence of the equilibrium.
Why is it interesting to study models with mid-auction information acquisition? A direct reason is its potential application in complex environments, where a bidder participates in many different auctions, such as in simultaneous ascending auctions or online auctions. In complex environments, gathering information and computing valuations for alI goods and combinations of goods can be an overwhelming task. It is not unreasonable to imagine that bidders approach the problem with just crude estimates of the valuations, and as the auctions proceed, they elect to concentrate their computational resources in evaluating the most promising alternatives. This paper is a first step towards modeling this behavior.
The current one good mo deI also offers an explanation on why sequential auctions seem to be so much more popular than their one-shot counterparts. Several explanations have been forwarded for this puzzle. Milgrom and Weber (1982) have shown that under affiliation a sequential English auction generates more revenue than one-shot, sealed-bid rules. An English auction may also in practice be superior to a Vickrey auction because it is more immune to manipulation by the auctioneer.
However, affiliated models are hard to generalize to more complex settings, such as auctions of multiple goods. In such complex situations one issue that becomes important to the bidders is the cost of collecting information and processing it into bidding strategies. This suggests an alternative explanation for why sequential auctions might be useful: they allow bidders to revise their decisions in information acquisition in the middle of the auctions, and this option might be valuable not only to bidders but to the seller as well. Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1988) has attempted to formally model this insight working with two-stage auctions. However, a two-stage auction is a formally difficult object and the existing results have been limited to very restrictive functional assumptions. The current model presents a more flexible and tractable way to capture this economic intuition.
This model may also be helpful in econometric applications. Data in the "serious" tail of the bid distribution usually reflect much more accurately the valuations of the bidders than the rest of the distribution. Since the equilibrium of this mo deI also has this feature, the model may potentially be helpful in structural estimation of auctions.
Given the fundamental role that asymmetric information takes in Contract Theory and Mechanism Design, there has been surprisingly little work that treats the information acquisition process as endogenous. Some authors have studied information acquisition in the context of Baron-Myerson-style agency mo deIs (Crémer and Khali11992, Lewis and Sappington 1997 , Crémer, Khalil, and Rochet 1998b , Crémer, Khalil, and Rochet 1998a .
Several authors have studied information acquisition in the context of auctions. In most cases, the analysis is restricted to ex-ante information acquisition, and to particular functional forms of the valuation and signal distributions.
1 Matthews (1984) and Persico (2000) study mo deIs where bidders can purchase information out of a continuum of alternative degrees of informativeness. To do so, they resolve in different ways the non-trivial problem of ranking distributions in terms of informativeness.
2 Due to the simple structure of the information acquisition problem that is imposed in this paper, this ranking is immediate here.
All papers cited in the last two paragraphs study situations where bidders are allowed to acquire information before the auction begins. Besides the already mentioned work Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1988) , Iam not aware of any literature on information acquisition in sequential auction procedures.
The paper is structured as follows: Next section presents the setup that is used throughout the paper. The problem of characterizing the best response of a given bidder is then investigated. Section 4 contains a proof that an equilibrium of this game exists. Section 5 compares this equilibrium to what would arise in a one-shot game. In section 6 results of some numerical lExamples are Milgrom (1981b) , Schweizer and von Ungern-Sternberg (1983) , Lee (1985) , Hausch and Li (1993) . Guzman and Kolstad (1997) study a setting similar to the one assumed here for one-shot procedures; however, these authors elect to characterize a rational expectations equilibrium in the spirit of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) , rather than use game-theoretical concepts.
2To do so, Persico (2000) uses the statistical notion of efficacy, due to Lehmann (1988) . Using efficacy, Athey and Levin (1998) 
The Setup
I seek to investigate an auction mo deI that is conventional in all aspects, except for the mid-auction information acquisition decision.
All bidders are symmetric and have independent private valuations for the good to be auctioned. I represent these valuations by i.i.d. random variables VI, ... ,V n , where n is the commonly known number of bidders. I assume that the distribution function of Vi, Fv, is absolutely continuous with support [O, v] .
The auction rules are also conventional: I mo deI a Japanese ascending auction, where the price p begins at a low leveI (that I assume for simplicity to be O) and increases continuously. Bidders should decide at which price to drop out. The auction ends when only one bidder is left, and he or she pays the price at which the last of the other bidders dropped out. If alI remaining bidders drop out at the same time, the winner is selected at random, with equal probability.
At possibility that some bidder eIects not to acquire information. Also, I assume that the distribution of Cj has an atom at O. Besides anaIyticaI convenience, these assumptions allow me to accommodate in the same framework bidders that cannot acquire information and bidders that aIready have alI information at the outset of the auction.
Apart from the atom at O, alI distributions are assumed to have densities, and those are bounded above and away from zero everywhere in the support.
I assume that a higher Wi is good news about Vi, in the sense of Milgrom (1981a) ; that is, if W > w', then Fvl w first-order stochastically dominates
F v1w
l .
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During the auction, the only information about the behavior of other players that a bidder observes is whether alI have dropped out or not, i.e., if the auction has ended or noto So I am ruling out both the possibility of observing early drop-out points or information acquisition points.
I conjecture that the assumption on the unobservability of drop-out points does not qualitatively affect the analysis (even though it greatly simplifies part of it). Notice that due to the IPV assumption, knowledge of other player's drop-out pointjvaluation does not change i's estimate of her own Vi, so a linkage effect as in Milgrom and Weber (1982) is not expected to existo
The second assumption is possibIy not innocuous; direct observation of the information acquisition point can in principIe generate additional strategic effects that have not been accounted for in the present model.
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The individual bidder's problem I begin by studying the individual bidder's problem, taking as given the behavior of the other bidders. For notational simplicity I drop the subscript i in this section and call Vi = V, etc.
It is convenient to summarize the other bidders' behavior in a reduced form fashion. Let the random variable y represent the price at which the last of the other bidders drops out.
Since y is a function of (Ci, W-i, V-i) , it is initially independent of the bidder's private information on Cj and Wi (and Vi, if she elects to acquire information right from start). I will denote this distributions of y by Fy.
Under the unobservability assumptions made in the end of last section, no 51 also assume that the slope of E [vlw] is bounded away from zero. information about y is obtained during the auction, except that y is greater than the current price. This alIows me to express the update of i's information about y in a simple way. If bidder i were alIowed to observe the other bidders' drop-out points, then the update formula would be more complexo
The information acquisition process that has been imposed alIows me to separate the possible strategies of the bidder in two groups: either she decides never to acquire information and drop out at a price fi, or she decides to wait until a price fi and acquire information at this point. fi = O represents immediate information acquisition, and fi = 00 represents never acquiring information (or dropping out of the auction), so alI pure strategies are represented by this parameterization. I consider in turn the optimal strategy within each grOUp, and later compare the two to find the overall optimal strategy. As will be seen in the equilibrium analysis in the next section, ones needs to consider only the optimal response to the cases where Fy is absolutely continuous. The appendix deals with the case where Fy contains jumps.
If the bidder decides to acquire information
The task in this section is to find the function fi( w, c, F y ), defined as the optimal information acquisition point for a bidder that observes a signal w of her valuation, faces a cost c to acquire information, and expects that the other bidders behave in such a way that the highest price at which any oí them stays in the auction is distributed according to y.
Define the function U(p, q) as the expected utility for a bidder that decides to acquire information when the price reaches q, conditional on the price oí the auction having reached p, that is, the expected (over v and y) profits conditional on w, c and Y 2: p. In a subgame perfect equilibrium fi should be chosen as the q that maximizes this function at any given p.
After acquiring the information v, the bidder's dropping decision is simpIe. It is dominant for her to drop out of the auction when p 2: v and stay otherwise. Throughout the paper I shall assume that this dominant strategy is always followed in this subgame. 
In the region where p < q, the bidder is staying in the auction without knowing her v. Let f:l.p be an interval of time sufficiently small, so that still p+ f:l.p < q. 8taying in the auction through this period, the bidders is subject to one out of two outcomes: she may win the auction alone 
At p = q the function U is not necessarily differentiable, since its leftand right-hand derivatives exist but are generally different. It turns out that by an application of the Envelope Theorem, the optimal fi is the point where U is differentiable with respect to p: 8uppose that at q the right-derivative is smaller than the left-derivative.
80 it is suboptimal to wait until q. Conversely, suppose now that the right-derivative is larger than the leftderivative. Consider an E > O small enough so that, at alI points between q and q + E, this relation still holds. Then U(p, q + E) > U(p, q), for ali p between q and q + E, and it would be suboptimal to acquire information at q.
7 As will be seen in the next section, if c is very large the bidder will elect not to acquire information in the first place, and the determination of p is irrelevant.
8
Finally, notice that, at O, c> Joo(O -v) dFvl w , so the argument of the last paragraph holds. Likewise, at fi the right-derivative is smaller, so this cannot be an optimum either. 80 the optimum must be interior.
U niqueness of fi comes from the fact that J: (p -v) dF v1w is a strictly increasing function of p inside the support of F v1w , since its derivative is
The optimality condition has a sensible economic interpretation: the cost of acquiring information, c, must be balanced against the benefit of doing so, namely, avoiding the potential loss from buying the good at a price higher than the bidder's valuation.
One remarkable feature about the condition that determines fi is that it depends solely on the distribution of vlw; it does not depend on the specified distributions for cor w, or on the behavior of the other players.
An immediate corollary is the following:
Corollary 1 lf c> O, then it is never optimal to acquire information at the start of the auction. As for w, notice that from the assumption that a higher w is good news
increasing in w, since the integrand is a weakly increasing function. 80 with a higher w one needs a higher fi to reduce that termo We conclude that fi is an increasing function of both c and w, and does not depend on the behavior of the other players.
If the bidder decides not to acquire information
This case can be handled in an analogous fashion, defining U(p, r) as the expected utility at p of a bidder that will drop out at r. Let fi be the optimal droJrout point, given that the bidder does not acquire information.
U(p, r) = O at the region where p > r, since then the bidder would have dropped the auction. Before that, U should obey the same differential equation that U obeys before the information is acquired, since the bidder's situation is the same in both instances:
Also, as before, the chosen p will be such that the Ú is differentiable
. This is expected: this is simply the dominant strategy for a player that could not acquire information in the first place, staying in the auction until her expected valuation is reached.
The overall optimal response
In order to obtain the optimal response, one compares the payoff of the bidder 
The information acquisition decision will depend on comparing these two quantities for each (c, w)-type.
Information acquisition as an option trade
It is convenient to rewrite the information acquisition decision in the following fashion:
So the decision of acquiring information looks like the decision of trading options on the underlying asset y; J rdFy is the expected profit from selling a call option on y at strike price p and buying a call option on J~ Fv1w(s)ds -c at strike price p. Figure 2 shows the shape of this r function. It is an asymmetric spread, that pays if y is dose to p, has negative value if y is too high, and O if y is too low. This suggests that information acquisition depends negatively on the variance of y with respect to vlw.
Comparative statics on the information acquisition decision
In the (c, w)-space, there will be a region A where condition
is satisfied. In order to investigate the properties of the region A, we need comparative statics results about the effect of c and w on U and U, and, to do so, again we invoke the Envelope Theorem.
Observe that U(O, p) is the value function of a problem with c and w as parameters, and where pis chosen to maximize U(O, q), with respect to q. The Envelope Theorem 8 then yields that lcU (O,p(c, w) 8Notice that the conditions for the Envelope Theorem are satisfied: U o is differentiable with respect to c and this derivative is continuous; and the solution <jJ(c, w) is unique (Milgrom 1999, Corollary 2) . To assess the effect of w we again invoke the Envelope Theorem to disregard the effect through fi or fi, and use the assumption that higher w's are good news.
Both v -y and max{ v-v, O} are increasing functions of v; so the integrals with respect to vlw that appear in both expressions increase with w. We conclude that 0(0, fi) and U(O, fi) both increase with w.
In the case where fi < fi, the sign of effect will depend on the comparison of the effect of w on two integrals of v -
The impact of a larger w on both terms is positive.
If the effect on the latter expression is larger than on the former, A shrinks with w, and vice-versa.
One does not need to investigate the other case, where fi > fi, because of the following result:
Proposition 2 For any type that strictly prefers to acquire information, fi < fi· Proof: The strategy of the proof is to establish that if
We start by noticing that, using equation 1, vlw] ' the first term is non-positive. 80 it remains to show that the third negative term dominates the second. For any y > fi, of course
80 the second and third terms are the integral of a non-positive integrando O
We collect the conclusions about a bidder's best response in the following 
Equilibrium
From Proposition 3, we know that the distribution of the drop-out point of a bidder that folIows the strategy described there is a mixture of max{p, v} and p. 80 the distribution of Yi and, Iikewise, y, inherits the smoothness properties imposed on the distributions of c, v and w.
To obtain an existence resuIt, it remains to verify that there exists a distribution Fy such that a best response to it generates itseIf. This is done in the next subsection.
Existence
Let F be the set of alI absolutely continuous distributions over [O, ti] Using this notation, the last object that we need to find to obtain a symmetric equilibrium is a distribution F* E :F such that the information acquisition decisions consistent with it generate it; that is, we need to find a fixed point
I will prove existence of an equilibrium applying the Schauder Fixed Point Theorem. To do so, I begin with some definitions from Topology.
A set is relatively compact if it is a subset of a compact set. A continuous application is a compact map if its image is relatively compacto I recall the following important result:
Theorem 1 (Ascoli-Arzelà) Let X be a compact metric space. lf S C C(X) is equicontinuous and bounded, then S is relatively compact.
It is convenient at this point to impose bounds in the densities of w, C Figure 2 ), against these distributions a positive mass of types will be indifferent about acquiring or not information and proposition 5 cannot be applied. It is not hard to impose assumptions that avoid this technical problem. For example, suppose that with some positive probability 7l' bidders start the game already knowing v. This is the same as assuming that there is an atom 7l' in the distribution of c at O, since bidders that start knowing v behave in exactly the same way as bidders with zero cost. This assumption is sufficient for existence; to see that, define, for 7l' 
Comparison with the One-shot Auction
One virtue of the present analysis of the sequential auction is that it easily accommodates the case of a one-shot, Vickrey auction.
In a Vickrey auction, the bidders can act exactly as they would in the sequential auction, except that is not feasible anymore to acquire information in the middle of the auction. 80 a mo deI of this auction is the same as the one studied so far, with the added restriction that fi = O. Notice that the derivative of that integral with respect to c is 1, no matter what Fy is expected to be.
Define, as before, Ro : F -+ A as follows: How do the equilibria of the two auctions compare? I have found out that, through numerical simulations, the distribution of the bids in the sequential auction frequently dominates the one in the one-shot auction. Because of that, one typically finds a higher expected revenue for the seller in the sequential procedure.
In this section I formally show that, at least when n is large, the expected revenue in the sequential auction is indeed higher. The numerical computations presented in the next section show that this ranking can also be true for n = 2, so the conclusion of this result can be valid under more general conditions.
As with the case of existence, I obtain the revenue comparison result through a series of propositions. I begin with a convenient definition: Therefore the difIerence in expected second-order statistics is proportional -uY-l] du. Let's look at the shape of each of the factors in square brackets to assess the sign of this expression.
Definition 1 A distribution F dominates C at the upper tail if there exists
llSee the proof of proposition 7 for the precise argument of why these ideas are related. 
So for large enough n, the differenee beeomes positive. O This is an useful result for revenue eomparisons, beeause expected revenues in auction mo deis are expeetations over seeond-order statistics, and also to efficieney eomparisons, being those related to eomparisons of moments of first-order statistics.
How the distributions of drop-out points in the sequential and the oneshot auetion compare? 
Proposition 11 For any F E :F, Ro(F) C R(F).

. Then for any F, T(R(F)) dominates To(Ro(F)) at the upper tail.
Proof: T(R(F)) -To(Ro(F)) = T(R(F))(x) -To(R(F))(x) + To(R(F)) -
To(Ro(F)) :S To(R(F)) -To(Ro(F)), by proposition 12.
Substituting formulas we ean write that To(R (F) (ÜJ, v) , Pr[p ::; xlc, w] = 1, so this term is non-positive.
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To see that the term is strietly negative, look at types with w close to iiJ and low (but not zero) c. In the move from the one-shot to the sequential auetion, a positive mass of those types switehed their information acquisition decision, sinee varies eontinuously with (at least) c. 80 R \ Ro has a positive mass for high w-types. This means that Pr[v ::; xlc, w] in a region with positive mass, and the inequality is indeed striet. D 80 we eonclude that, holding the behavior of the opponents fixed, the effeet of the ehange in the rules is an upper-tail dominanee for drop-out points of an individual bidder. This in turn implies a ranking in expected revenue. AlI that remains is to obtain the result in equilibrium eomparisons, as well. This is done through the folIowing result from Milgrom and Roberts (1994) : An application of this result to the problem at hand yields: Proposition 14 For large enough n, the set expected revenues of all symmetric equilibria of the sequential auction is higher than the set of expected revenues of the one-shot auction equilibria.
Proof: Take an appropriate closed, eonvex restriction of the domain of T o R such that it is eontinuous, like :F rr , and eonsider its image (that belangs in it, by proposition 6). Aeeording to proposition 4, the closure of its image, K, is eompact, is eonneeted and lies inside :F rr • Any fixed points wilI be in K as welI, and we ean safely restrict attention to this set.
CalI the seeond-order expectation funetional J.L :
by the previous propositions we know there is a n*(F) so that, for (Ro(F))) . Take an open balI around F so that this property still halds inside it. Doing that for every F, we obtain an open covering of K. But K is eompact; so there is a finite subeovering, and a maximal n*, such that
13Continuity but for upward jumps means that, for any x, limsuPxk)"x rPH(X/c, t) :5 rPH(X, t) and liminf xk ,,"x rPdXk' t) ~ rPL(X, t).
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Being K compact and connected, J1.(K) is a compact, connected set as well. It has to be a compact interval; call it [a, b] . Define the </J of Theorem 3 to be </J :
Let's first verify that </J(m, t) is a compact interval, as required by Theorem 3. Since {m} is closed and J1. is continuous, J1. -1 (m) is a closed set within a compact, and therefore is compacto It is also path-connected. 14 Its image through the continuous application J1. o T o R is also connected and compacto So </J(m, t) is a compact interval in [O, v] , since these are the only connected sets on the line.
To verify continuity but for upward jumps, start with a sequence mie /" m, and the corresponding sequence </JH(mk, t). Take a subsequence that converges to lim sup </JH(mk, t). To each element of it there is a function Fk in J1. -1(mk) . This sequence of functions belong to a compact set, so it has a subsequence that converges to a function F.
The argument for the lim inf part is analogous. Applying Theorem 3 leads to the conclusion that there are two sets, 10 and 11, such that (i) the expectations of equilibria in the one-shot game are in 10 and those in the sequential auction are in 11,
(ii) inf 10 ~ inf 11 and (iii) sup 10 ~ sup!t.
This conclusion is not quite sufficient for our purposes because 10 and 11 may potentially be very large. There are many fixed points of </J that are not equilibria: any distribution with the property that J1.
(F) = J1.(T(R(F)))
would "look like" a fixed point from the point of view of </J.
To fix this important flaw, consider the family {</JkhE{0,1,2, ... } of corre- Since all involved operations are continuous, alI the arguments done before for </J apply again for each </Jk, and we obtain sets lt and lf with properties (i), (ii) and (iii) as before. Consider lá = nk lt and li = nk lf. These sets also have the same properties, and furthermore cannot contain any point that does not correspond to a true equilibrium expected revenue.
IIF-T(R(F)
. This is a sequence in a compact; it has a subsequence converging to a distribution F and, by continuity,
The corresponding set of indices is exploding; so this equation can only be satisfied if IIF -To(Ro(F) 
, and this contradicts proposition 13. O
Examples
This section discusses the computation for some choices of distributions for c, w and v. The motivation for this exercise is twofold: first, it shows how an equilibrium can be computed.
15 Second, it establishes some quantitative meaning to the comparative statics finding that the sequential auction revenue-dominates the one-shot procedure.
As mentioned before, for alI examples simulated this revenue ranking holds for any number of bidders between 2 and 10. Numerical results also suggest that it might be true that in fact the distribution of drop-out points in the sequential auction in fact first-order stochastically dominates the one in the one-shot auction.
I begin by discussing the computational method.
Computational Method
To compute the equilibrium, I iterate until a fixed point is found, but instead of working with the F space, I work on the A space; that is, I seek to find a set A* of (c, w)-types such that A* = R o T(A*).
All expectations are calculated through a quasi-Monte Carlo method. More specifically, 3 Weyl sequences with K elements have been drawn. 16 15In particular, equilibria exist and are easy to compute also in conditions not covered by the existence theorem. 1 6 The number of draws utilized so far has ranged from 3000 to 9000. This is admittedly quite small, and I plan to report in a later version results from a much larger sample.
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Two of these sequences have been used to construct samples of (c, w)-types, and the corresponding p and p have been computed.
17
Given a candidate set At, the algorithm computes the distribution of Yi (the individual bidder drop-out point) that would arise if only types in At acquired information. For each type, it is then computed what is the best information acquisition decision against the highest order-statistic of y, and this leads to a new At+1. The method then iterates until convergence. 18 An advantage of this rather crude procedure is that the representation of A is left free; I have tried before parameterizations for the border of A, 19 but polynomials or splines did not seem to fit this function well.
A disadvantage is that of course the method need not necessarily converge. My experience so far is that the distance Pr(At \ At+1 U At+1 \ At) goes down quite fast in the first couple of iterations, so the initial guess does not seem to be much important. 80 "almost" convergence is easy to achieve in most cases. Literal convergence, that is, to drive the distance of At and At+l to literally zero, sometimes is somewhat harder. 80 some loops may exist, but the sets that loop seem to be dose to each other for the cases that have been studied so far.
Numerical Results
Here results for the case with w ~ U [O, 1] and c ~ U [O, 0.05] are considered. I analyze three alternatives for the distribution of vlw, for n between 2 and 10.
The three alternatives for the distribution of vlw were U [O, 2w] , U [w, w+l] and U [w, 1] . The reason for these choices was to look at distributions where the variance increases, stays constant, and decreases with w. This is of interest because according to the discussion of section 3.3.1, the impact of w through variance is a potentially important determinant of information acquisition. 20 17The last sequeoce is used to obtain a sample of vlw where oeeded.
18Notice that by focusing 00 symmetric equilibria and Yi rather than directly computing a sample Y = max{Yl, ... ,Yn-l}, ooe cao avoid the curse of dimensiooality: lo the present algorithm the oumber of q-MC draws does oot depeod 00 n.
19Recall that, as loog as 1 -Fy(jJ) > 0, this border is the graph of a functioo c(w) in the (w, c)-plane.
2°Notice that these distributiooal assumptions violate several of the cooditions imposed in the theoretical parto This illustrates the fact that those assumptions were made for Besides computing equilibria for these 24 cases, I have also computed the equilibria of the corresponding one-shot auction in each case. This allowed me to calculate the expected revenue for the seller in each case. Table 1 presents the computed expected revenue of the seller under each circumstance. In order to provide a benchmark, the first column shows what would be the revenue if information was costless to all bidders (Le., if every bidder would drop out at V). 21 The second and third columns show the expected revenue in the one shot and the sequential auctions. Finally, the last column shows the percentage difference of revenue (in terms of the oneshot auction).
In percentage terms, the increased revenue of a sequential procedure ranges from O to 6% -arguably, an economically significant figure. In almost alI cases the gain is positive. A negative gain has been computed in the last specification for large values of n. It is not clear whether this is in fact true or it is due to the imprecision of the computation for high values of n.
It is interesting to note that as n grows large, the gain becomes small, both in absolute and percentage terms. This observation, coupled with the asymptotic comparison result, suggests that the expected revenue is generally higher with the sequential procedure. Table 2 shows the ex-ante expected payoff of an individual bidder under each rule for alI settings, Le., the expected profit average over all (c, w)-types. In most cases the expected payoff under the sequential procedure is lower than in the one-shot auction. 80 sequential auctions seem to benefit the seller partially at the expense of the bidders.
Figures 4, 5 and 6 exhibit how the sets of types that acquire information (top panels) and the distributions of the individual drop-out points (bottom panels) are under each alternative. For convenience, only equilibria with n = 2 are depicted. Equilibria with more bidders have smaller information acquisition regions, but the the shape of these regions and of the drop-out convenience, and are not necessary for existence or revenue rankings. 21 A counterintuitive finding is that 50metimes the sequential auction is more profitable than if information was for free. This can only occur however for n = 2. The logic is the following: suppose c is extremely high, 50 that nobody effectively buys information.
In this case the revenue is the expected value of the second order statistic of a sample of E [vlwi] ' rather than of Vi. With many bidders, the latter is larger than the former, but not when the number ofbidders is 2: in this case, E[min{E [vlwl] The lower panels show that typically the distribution of drop-out points in the sequential auction almost dominates the one for the one-shot auction.
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The impact of the sequential rule can occur either at lower, intermediate or upper quantiles.
As top panels show, the information acquisition regions are indeed monotonic in c, but not necessarily so in w. A more optimistic signal about the good's valuation can make the bidder more (as in the first specification) or less (as in the second one) eager to acquire information, depending on how this news affect the dispersion of her valuation vis-à-vis the auction price.
A A ppendix: N on-existence in the degenerate case
This appendix shows that, if the set of types is degenerate, an equilibrium may not existo Consider the best response to a distribution of y that is mixed, Le., has an absolutely continuous component and a finite set of atoms. Define (; and p as before. I contend that, as long as an atom of y does not occur at p, this is still the optimal information acquisition point.
The reason for that is that atoms at p =I P do not fundamentally affect the derivation of the differential equation characterization done before, once derivatives are appropriately replaced by discrete jumps.
Take an interval [p, p + dp). If no atom of y falIs in this interval for small enough dp, the derivation done before is unchanged. There may however be an atom at p. We can always take dp small enough so that there are no atoms in (p, p + dp). In this case, it is still possible to write, say,
+ [1 -(Fyly~p(P + dp) -Fyly~(P))]U(p + dp, q) for p + dp < q. The only problem is that Fyly~p(P + dp) -+ Fyly~(P+) > Fyly~(P). 80 U is discontinuous at this point; but the discontinuity point 22The "almost" is due to the fact that there is usually a region where the comparison is slightly reverse. It is not clear at this point whether this is a feature of the problem or just due to numerical errors. has the same "size" as its derivative would have otherwise, in the following sense: the jump b.U(p, q) = 1imdp--+o U(p + dp, q) The same observation applies to the case where p > q.
So the discontinuities in the distribution of y are immaterial in the choice of p (and, likewise p) as long as the probability of a tie between this bidder and others is still O. That will be the case if atoms occur before p, since the bidder will not exit at this point, or after p, since the probability of a tie is the probability of v falling in a measure O set.
What happens however if there is an atom at exactly p? If the bidder follows the strategy described in Proposition 3 (which is the only sensible candidate for a best response by what we have seen so far) she plans to drop out with strictly positive probability at p, in the event she finds out that v < p. If there is a positive probability of the last of the others dropping out at the same time, a tie occurs with positive probability. Furthermore, the valuation for the good will be smaller than its price if she wins the auction under these circumstances. So the expected profit of adopting this strategy includes a negative term that could be avoided if she acquired the information slightly before p. 
